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I.

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This

a wrongful termination 0f employment case under Idaho’s whistleblower statute,

is

the Idaho Protection 0f Public

Smith was terminated as

Highway
in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

District

lost”

in

in

A four-day jury trial was

March and April 2016.

Which the jury rendered a verdict

et al. Joanie

of $6,086.00 by the Glenns Ferry

retaliation for reporting the theft

Ofﬁce Manager

Elmore County

income

Employees Act (“[PPEA”), Idaho Code section 6-2101

in favor

conducted

0f Smith and awarded her “past

0f $63,043.92 and “future income lost” 0f $187,500.00. However, the

district court

declined t0 enter judgment 0n the jury’s verdict. Instead, the district court declared, after the
that the jury’s verdict

itself the trier

of

fact

was merely advisory 0n the lone
on the issue 0f future

lost

trial,

issue of future lost wages. After declaring

wages, the

district court substantially

reduced

Smith’s award for future lost wages from $187,500.00 t0 $44,622.34 (a seventy-six percent
reduction). Smith hereby appeals the district court’s ﬁnal

Memorandum

Decision and Order and

seeks entry ofjudgment nuncpro tunc on the jury’s verdict, and an award of interest and reasonable
attorney’s fees.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Both Smith and the Glenns Ferry Highway

respective Complaint andAnswer. R. V01.

Both

I,

parties thereafter stipulated t0 a trial

stipulation, the

trial in

trial,

the

made demands

for trial

645—49 (Complaint); R. V01.

by jury. R. V01.

Honorable District Judge Jonathan

the district court’s

a four-day

p.

District

Medema

I,

p.

I,

p.

by jury

in their

650—54 (Answer).

656—58. Pursuant

t0 the parties’

ordered the case t0 be tried as a jury

Order Governing Proceedings And Setting

Trial. R. V01.

I,

p. 660.

After

Elmore County jury rendered a Special Verdict Form ﬁnding the Glenns Ferry

Highway District violated the IPPEA. R. Vol.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

1

I,

p.

527—32. The jury awarded Smith “past income

lost”

Id.

0f $63,043.92 and “future income lost” 0f $187,500.00, for a

total verdict

Smith thereafter submitted a proposed Judgment for entry 0f the jury’s

The

district court

7,

verdict.

did not enter judgment 0n the jury’s verdict, as required

Instead, the district court requested brieﬁng

March

0f $250,543.92.

2018 (twenty-six days

after the Special

that the district court disregard the jury’s verdict,

“front pay” t0

I.R.C.P. 58.

on the nature 0f the remedies sought by Smith.

On

Jury Verdict), Glenns Ferry Highway District

submitted Defendant ’s Motion 0n the Verdict. R. V01.

amount 0f “back pay” and

by

I,

p.

562—63. Defendant’s motion requested

and asked

that the district

award Smith under the

judge determine the

own

district court’s

discretion.

Smith opposed the motion and requested judgment be entered consistent with the Special Jury

Both Smith and

Verdict.

remedy

for either party

GFHD

due

t0 the contentiousness

attorney’s fees and costs, and a

pro tunc

agreed the equitable remedy 0f reinstatement was not a desired

0f the

litigation.

Smith also ﬁled a motion for

Motion for Entry ofJudgment requesting entry ofjudgment nunc

retroactive t0 the date 0f the jury’s verdict.

On May 25, 20 1 8, more than three months after the jury’s verdict, the district court released
its

Memorandum

court premised

its

Decision and Order and entered Judgment. R. V01.
decision 0n the basis that “the

available under the statute.” Id. at 749.

The

I,

p.

738—72. The

IPPEA does not list front pay among the remedies
district court

then ruled “because front pay

‘inextricably linked with the equitable determination regarding reinstatement,’

characterized as an equitable remedy.” Id. at 750.

0f the

trial

district

it

is

is

properly

The district court then performed its own analysis

testimony and reduced the jury’s verdict for “future income lost” from $ 1 87,500.00 t0

$44,622.34.

Id. at

pay on the basis

The

753—56. However, the

that the issue

district court’s

district court

declined t0

was properly decided by the jury

Memorandum

amend

the jury’s

as the trier

0f fact.

2

Id. at

759.

Decision and Order also ruled against Joanie Smith 0n

several other important issues. For example, the district court held Joanie Smith

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

award 0f back

was not

entitled

to interest

on the judgment pursuant t0 Idaho Code section 28-22-104.

also ruled in favor 0f Glenns Ferry

Highway

Highway District 0n

District objected to the hourly rate

compensate her attorney, Jeffrey

J.

Id. at

764.

The

district court

the issue 0f attorney’s fees. Glenns Ferry

of $400.00 per hour Smith contractually agreed to

Hepworth. The

district court ruled,

“Although the Court does

not dispute that other Boise attorneys have charged similar fees under a variety of circumstances,

it

does not agree that $400.00

768.

The

district court

is

a reasonable hourly rate in this case.” (emphasis added).

reduced the hourly rate of Jeffrey

$325.00 per hour, and the hourly rate ofjunior partner
to $ 1 50.00

an hour.

the contractual

Id. at

769.

The

district court

amount 0f $203,131.00 down

In light 0f the district court’s

otherwise

district court’s

motions were argued before the

t0 $168,177.00. Id.

Memorandum Decision and

district court

Order, Smith ﬁled a Motionfor

pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. Rule 52(3),

judgment pursuant

7,

2018

14, 2018. In a

district court

(b).

and 60(b). Both

second

Memorandum

granted in part and denied in part

Smith’s motion for amended ﬁndings 0f fact and conclusions 0f law. See Supp. R. V01.

The

district court

original decision

C.

denied Smith’s Motionfor Post Judgment Reliefin

and judgment. Smith hereby appeals the

Smith

t0 request reconsideration 0r

to I.R.C.P. 11.2(b), 59(6),

0n August

Decision and Order dated February 25, 2019, the

98.

t0

Grady Hepworth from $175.00 an hour

Motion for Post Judgment Relief 0n June

amend the

Hepworth from $400.00 per hour

thereby reduced Smith’s total attorney’s fees from

Amended Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw
also submitted a

J.

J.

Id. at

its

entirety

I,

p.

71—

and upheld

its

district court’s decisions.

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In

District

August 2007, Joanie Smith was hired

(“GFHD”) by

the

GFHD

as an

employee 0f the Glenns Ferry Highway

Ofﬁce Manager, Linda Jensen

220—221, L. 21—2. The day-to-day operations 0f the highway

managed by two

individuals: Superintendent

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

3

(“Jensen”). Tr. V01.

district

I,

at 306, p.

were almost exclusively

Jim Gluch (who served as GFHD’S Designated

Representative at

trial)

183, p. 594, L. 1—7.

Tr. V01.

I,

and Jensen.

Tr. Vol.

I,

The two managers were

173—174,

at

p.

557, L. 21—14; see also Tr. V01.

Commissioners. R. V01.

I,

p.

495, Jury Instruction N0. I 0. The

comprised of three elected individuals: Chairman

GFHD

Board of

GFHD Board 0f Commissioners is

Dewey Crane, Commissioner Mark Noble, and

Commissioner Harley Riggs. Chairman Crane and Commissioner Riggs both testiﬁed

and

at trial,

both admitted they were generally unaware of the day-to-day operations 0f the highway

district,

and neither commissioner had personal knowledge 0f Smith’s performance as an employee.
V01.

I,

at

171—172,

549—550, L. 21—6 (Commissioner Riggs); Tr. V01.

p.

(Chairman Crane). The Commissioners relied upon Gluch and Jensen
district.

R. V01.

to-day basis.

I,

at 184, p.

599, L. 12—22 (“Yes

They

are the managers.

I,

at 182, p. 593, L.

to operate the

They

are there

Tr.

4—24

highway
0n a day-

We are not”)

Initially,

Smith’s job duties at

GFHD were limited,

and mainly consisted 0f picking up the

mail, answering phones, and providing janitorial services. Tr. V01.

However, Smith’s job
22.

at

dozen employees.

collectively responsible for about a

307, p. 224, L. 16—23. Mr. Gluch and Jensen reported t0 the

at

I,

During the March

retirement” t0 the

responsibilities at

10,

at

306, p. 222—23, L. 16—1.

Tr. V01.

I,

at

309, p. 32, L. 15—

2016 Board 0f Commissioners meeting, Jensen announced her “semi-

GFHD Board 0f Commissioners:

Linda explained she

Monday

GFHD steadily increased.

I,

&

is

Tuesday and

March 31“, 2016 and will be working on
Joanie Will work Wednesday & Thursday. We will

semi-retiring
that

continue t0 operate in the ofﬁce as

budget in April and

it

we have

will

[sic]

Commissioner Riggs suggested we

have

start

it

in the past.

She Will

start

working 0n

ready t0 be approved in August.

taking applications for secretarial position

it was necessary as long as she was still here in
Commissioner Riggs asked how long did she think she would continue
work here and Linda stated 2-3 years.

inside the ofﬁce. Linda did not feel

the ofﬁce.
t0

Conﬁdential R. V01.

I,

p. 10,

EX. 2 at

GFHD

138 (emphasis added); see also Tr. V01.

I,

at

31

1,

p.

243, L. 20—25 Commissioner Harley Riggs testiﬁed that although he inquired whether Jensen and
.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

4

Smith would need more help, Jensen assured him

Manager

that Jensen

and Smith could

split the

Ofﬁce

duties equally:

Q.

You

asked

if

you should advertise

to post for

an extra position in the ofﬁce;

is

that correct?

A. Yes.

Q: And those minutes reﬂect
any help.

that

Ms. Jensen reassured you

that they didn’t

need

A. Correct.

Q.

And that as long as Ms. Jensen was in the ofﬁce, that she and Joanie could handle

the duties.

A. Correct.

Q: Did you
A. N0,

we

advertise for the position during that

March meeting?

did not.

Q: Were you satisﬁed with Ms. Jensen’s reply?
A. At the time, yes. Yeah.
Tr. V01.

I,

at 175, p.

562—63, L. 13—5 (Cross Examination ofHarley Riggs). Smith’s duties and

responsibilities substantially increased as

in the

Smith and Jensen began

splitting

time and responsibility

GFHD ofﬁce equally:
Q.

And even though Linda

believe that Ms. Smith

Ms. Jensen continued

Jensen had told the board that

was capable of doing her job, was

t0 train Joanie

it

time they didn’t
your understanding that
at that

Smith?

A. Yes.

Q.

And that over time —Well, what was the purpose in your mind for her t0 be trained

in Linda’s Job?

A. She needed t0 learn more about Linda’s job. She hadn’t done everything
involved in the job. So ves, Linda was going to train her more and give her
more responsibilitv. That was my understanding.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

5

Tr. V01.

575, L. 12—25 (Redirect Examination ofHarley Riggs) (emphasis added).

at 178, p.

I,

Smith began training With Jensen in order to eventually take over as the full-time Ofﬁce Manager:

And you were

Q.

that

talking about going to a system

I did,

because

I

knew

would be learning things
I,

to reduce

48 hours to 32 hours. Did you appreciate that?

A. Sure

Tr. Vol.

where you were going

at

t0

would take on more responsibility, and that
take 0n -- take over at a later time.
I

I

312, p. 246, L. 17—23 (Direct Examination ofJoanie Smith). Smith began taking on

additional duties like taking the minutes at the Commissioner’s meetings, completing

payroll, assisting with the annual audit,

51, L. 25—7; Tr. V01.

I,

at 49, p. 58, L.

and learning

t0

d0 the budget.

Tr. V01.

I,

GFHD’S

at 172, p.

550—

5—1 8 (Smith began taking over the audit and formatting the

budget).

1.

Linda Jensen Stolefrom
After the

March

10th

GFHD and Smith Engaged in a

“Protected Activity”

Commissioner meeting, Jensen took two weeks’ vacation

in Hawaii,

but came back before the end 0f the month t0 ﬁnalize the payroll and prepare her retirement

documents. Tr. V01.

I,

at

314, p. 254, L. 18—23.

On March

28, 2016, Jensen

came

to the

GFHD

ofﬁce t0 cut herself two pay checks: one for her last salary check, and the other for unused vacation.
Tr. Vol.

I,

at

315, p. 256, L. 17—23. Although checks were supposed t0 be signed

and Chairman Crane,
checks. Tr. V01.

I,

it is

undisputed that Chairman Crane never personally signed

at 3 13, p.

251, L. 8—1

1.

Instead, Jensen used a

signature, allowing Jensen t0 write the checks Without

As Smith was completing
were not

overpayments
at trial that

I,

at

315, p. 256—57, L. 17—4.

t0 Superintendent Gluch. Tr. V01.

Smith thereby engaged in an

Jury Instruction N0. 10, ﬂ

3.

I,

at

6

stamp with Chairman Crane’s

amounts

315, p. 258—59, L. 13—2.

activity protected

under LC.

§

Id.

that Jensen paid herself

The next morning Smith reported

The next month, Jensen was

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

GFHD’S

any oversight from the Commissioners.

the payroll registry, Smith noticed the

correct. Tr. V01.

by both Jensen

It

was undisputed

6—2104. R. V01.

instructed t0 repay

the

GFHD.

I,

p.

495,

Instead,

Jensen stole more money. R. V01.

I,

p. 108,

EX. 39A. Jensen stole a total of $6,086.00 from

GFHD.

Id.

Despite Jensen’s

theft,

GFHD

never disciplined Jensen. In

fact,

GFHD

rewarded Jensen

with a guaranteed contract that paid her a part-time monthly salary 0f $3,075.85 (an effective rate

of $48.00 an hour). R. V01.

Employment” 0f “At
share the

p. 73,

one year.”

least

Ofﬁce Manager

I,

EX. 22. Jensen’s

Id.

The

new

contract provided for a “Duration of

contract also provided that Jensen and Smith

would

duties:

Duties for Linda Jensen will be the same as before semi-retirement, with the
assistance 0f Joanie Smith

Id.

The
2.

contract

was signed by

all

Who Will work on Wednesday & Thursday of each week.
three Commissioners,

Jim Gluch, as well as Jensen.

Linda Jensen Retaliated Against Smith
Smith thereafter experienced a dramatic change in her work environment

after

at

Jensen claimed t0 “repay”

work. During the

V01.

I,

Id.

Smith received a strange

call

GFHD’S

meetings. Tr. V01.

Shortly

from Jensen while Smith was

Who

reported

it

t0

Chairman

response was merely to forbid Sm_ith from attending the Commissioner
at 47, p. 53, L.

I,

GFHD.

Jensen threatened Smith and told her “you better watch your back.” Tr.

47—48, L. 20—4. Smith reported the threat t0 Gluch,

at 46, p.

Crane, but

call

GFHD,

at

7—20.

Jensen also began creating what Jim Gluch described as “friction” in the ofﬁce with Smith.
Tr. V01.

I,

at 108, p.

conduct. Id. In

296, L. 18—24. Smith repeatedly complained t0 Jim Gluch about Jensen’s

May 2016,

hour. See R. V01.

I,

p.

Smith requested a

67, EX. 8.

Commissioners for Smith

raise

from her supervisor, Jim Gluch,

Jim Gluch admitted

to receive the raise, that

that

t0

$19.00 per

he personally advocated t0 the

he was satisﬁed with Smith’s performance

during this time, and that he believed the Commissioners thought Smith was doing a good job. Tr.
V01.

I,

at 107, p.

290, L. 4—7; Tr. V01.
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at 109, p.

298—299, L. 1—25. The Commissioners met July

7,

t0 discuss Smith’s request for a raise.

2016

Jim Gluch testiﬁed

that Jensen

demanded

Q: So we know for an absolute
t0

Conﬁdential R. V01.

that

GFHD

I,

Ex. 2

p. 23,

GFHD

ﬁre Smith for asking for the

149—153.

raise:

Linda was advocating either in June or July
terminate Joanie because she asked for a raise t0 $19 an hour, right?
fact that

A: That’s correct.
Tr. V01.

I,

294—95, L. 13—1. Just as Jensen demanded, the July

at 108, p.

7,

Meeting minutes reﬂect the Commissioners’ decision t0 grant Smith a raise

2016 Commissioner

t0

$18.00 an hour (not

the $19.00 requested) and t0 immediately advertise for Smith’s position:

Motion by Commissioner Noble, second Commissioner Riggs, t0 give Joanie Smith
a raise t0 $18.00 an hour effective July 1, 2016, motion passed.
Motion by Commissioner Riggs, second Commissioner Noble, to immediately
advertise for a part/full time employee for the GFHD Ofﬁce. Motion passed.
Conﬁdential R. V01.
Tr. V01.

I,

On

I,

p. 24,

at 55, p. 83, L.

EX. 2

GFHD

149—153. The job advertisement ran on July 20, 2016.

1—24; see also R. V01.

I,

Ex. 37.

p. 86,

July 26, 2016, Jensen requested a special meeting with the Board of Commissioners,

and demanded

that

GFHD

Commissioners voted

terminate Smith. Tr. V01.

t0 terminate

Smith

at

I,

at 116, p.

329, L. 9—12. The Board 0f

Jensen’s request. Tr. V01.

I,

at 116, p. 327, L.

Jim Gluch subsequently delivered a Notice ofLeave With Pay Pending Investigation
her home. See R. V01.

I,

p. 65,

decision to suspend. Tr. V01.

I,

EX

7,

GFHD

at 111, p.

256—257.

GFHD

t0

18—21.

Smith

at

did not give Smith a reason for the

307, L. 21—24; see also Tr. V01.

On August 4, 2016, GFHD terminated Smith Via a Notice ofTermination.

I,

at 61, p. 106, L. 1—6.

R. V01.

I,

p. 63,

EX. 5

at

GFHD 254.
3.

It Is

Undisputed that

At trial

when

it

GFHD

Violated the

IPPEA

was undisputed that Smith participated

in a “protected activity”

she reported Jensen’s overpayments t0 Gluch, and that
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under the IPPEA

decision t0 terminate Smith

was an “adverse
6.

The only

action” as

deﬁned by the IPPEA. R. V01.

Question N0.

Highway

I,

p. 527,

495, Jury Instruction N0. 10, ﬂ

3,

On February 9,

Plaintiff Joanie

2018, the jury found in favor of Smith:

Smith Prove that Defendant Glenns Ferry
of Public Employees Act?

District Violated the Idaho Protection

Answer
R. V01.

Did

1:

p.

was whether Smith’s termination was motivated by her

issue in dispute at trial

participation in the protected activity.

I,

t0 Question 1:

Yes

Special Jury Form. Similarly, the court in

Decision and Order, afﬁrmed the jury’s ﬁndings in

its

own

its

February 25, 2019

Memorandum

conclusions of law:

Ms. Smith’s actions 0f reporting the overpayment t0 Ms. Jensen t0 Mr. Gluch
was a communication in good faith 0f the existence 0f waste of public funds by the
GFHD. LC. § 6—2104(1)(a).
8.

9. The termination of Ms. Smith in August of 2016, was determined by the jury to
be because 0f her reporting 0f the overpayments by Ms. Jensen.

10. Therefore, the termination

0f Ms. Smith’s employment constitutes an “adverse

action” under the IPPEA. LC. § 6-2130(1)

Supp. R. V01.

was an

I,

p. 85,

11

ofFebruary

1,

determining

that

id. at 11

20.

The jury speciﬁcally found

Smith would have begun working

full

time

as a

at

measure

GFHD as

3:

How many

hours per

income

to Question N0. 3:

week 0f employment

did you use in

lost?

16-hrs

1

40-hrs

1

Sep 2016 through 31 Jan 2017
Feb 2017 through 31 Jan 2018

p. 529.

The
decision

damages

Plaintiff” s past

Answer

I,

lost

by the jury. See

2017:

Question N0.

R. V01.

8—10. The district court also recognized that the issue 0f past income lost

issue properly decided

0f Smith’s past income

[sic].

district court left the jury’s past lost

wages ﬁgure undisturbed, but nulliﬁed

by only awarding Smith part-time hours

for the future

755. Smith seeks t0 have the district court’s reduced future
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the jury’s

damages award. See R. V01.

damages award vacated, and

I,

p.

for this

Court

t0 order the district court t0 enter judgment

and reasonable attorney’s

0n the jury’s

damages award, plus

full

interest

fees.

ISSUES PRESENTED

III.

ON APPEAL

A) Did the District Court err by denying Smith her right
the trier offact 0n the issue offuture lost wages?

t0 trial byjurfy

when itfound

itselfto

be

B) Did the District Court err by ignoring the substantial evidence supporting the jury’s award
forfuture lost wages?
C)

Did Smith provide adequate

notice pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. Rule 8(a) that She

was seeking

damagesforfull—time employment?

m

D) Did

the District Court err by ruling post-judgment interest applicable t0 “judgment 0f
”
competent court 0r tribunal under Idaho Code section 28-22-104 was barred by sovereign

immunity?
E) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by arbitrarily reducing Plaintiﬁ’iv attorney’s fees
”
from the “reasonable rate 0f$400 per hour down t0 $325 per hour?
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court will not set aside a jury verdict 0n appeal

competent evidence.” Van

v.

PortneufMed.

Ctr.,

if

it is

supported by substantial and

Ina, 156 Idaho 696, 700, 330 P.3d 1054, 1058

(2014) (applying IPPEA). “[W]hen reviewing a jury verdict 0n appeal the evidence adduced at
trial is

construed in a light most favorable t0 the party

Freightlines, Inc.

v.

Bannock Paving

C0., Ina,

who prevailed

at trial.” Id. (quoting Garrett

112 Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987)).

“The evidence supporting the jury’s verdict may be contradicted, but the verdict
it is

‘of such sufﬁcient quantity and probative value that reasonable

verdict 0f the jury

was

proper.’

P.3d 755, 758 (2011) (quoting

”

Mackay

Mann

v.

v.

Four Rivers Packing

Safeway

Stores, Ina,

will be upheld if

minds could conclude

that the

C0., 151 Idaho 388, 391,

257

95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194,

1198 (1974)). “This Court will not second guess the jury’s determinations as t0 the weight 0f the
evidence and witness credibility.” Ballard

v.

Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 686, 378 P.3d 464, 476 (2016).

“[A] jury verdict 0n issues 0f negligence and causation will not be disturbed 0n appeal unless
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it

appears t0 the reviewing court that the verdict

evidence or

is

either not supported

is

against the clear weight 0fthe evidence.”

Cramer v.

by

Slater,

substantial

competent

146 Idaho 868, 879, 204

P.3d 508, 519 (2009).

“The calculation 0f reasonable attorney
Lettunich

v.

fees

is

within the discretion 0f the

trial

court.”

Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258, 261 (2008). “This Court also reviews a

district court’s ruling

0n equitable remedies for abuse 0f discretion.” Climax,

LLC v.

Oncology ofE. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791, 794, 241 P.3d 964, 967 (2010). The
0f discretion

is

“whether the

trial court: (1)

Snake River

test for

an abuse

correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2)

acted Within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

reason.”

Lunneborg

v.

My Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

V.

ARGUMENT

A. The District Court Wrongfullv Denied Smith Her Constitutional Right t0 Trial
1.

GFHD

BV Jurv

Waived Its Right t0 Challenge the Jury Trial and Submitted an Untimely

Motion

As

a preliminary matter, Smith objects to the very procedural nature in

Which

GFHD

presented Defendant’s Motion 0n the Verdict, and which the district court considered Whether

Smith was

entitled t0 a trial

district court’s

by jury 0r a court

trial

after the jury trial

judgment should be vacated because

GFHD waived

was already completed. The

its

right t0 challenge Smith’s

jury verdict and improperly submitted an untimely and improperly pleaded motion.

GFHD
bound by its

waived

its

right t0 bring Defendant’s

stipulation t0 trial

by jury,

Motion 0n

the Verdict because

as well as the district court’s

GFHD

was

Order Governing Proceedings

And Setting Trial, in Which the district judge ordered a trial by jury. “A stipulation between counsel
entered

upon

the minutes of the court
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is

generally

deemed binding upon

the parties.” Savage

Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n

Furthermore, the

district court

v.

was

Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 245, 869 P.2d 554, 562 (1993).

also

bound by

Setting Trial. “While counsel truly cannot bind a court

is

entirely

up

to the court

Whether or not

by counsel’s

to accept the stipulation

not bind the court, but scheduling orders do.”

1,

own Order Governing Proceedings And

its

KDNMgmt.,

Inc.

v.

.

stipulation as t0 procedure,

.

.

it

Stipulations 0f counsel d0

WinCo Foods, LLC, 164 Idaho

423 P.3d 422, 428 (2018) (emphasis added). The stipulation and corresponding Court Order

bound

all

parties t0 trying Smith’s case as a trial

breach

its

own

stipulation Via Defendant’s

by jury, and

Motion 0n the

GFHD therefore waived its right t0

Verdict.

GFHD

Smith also notes that nowhere in Defendant’s motion does
under Idaho’s Rules 0f Civil Procedure that procedurally supported

Rule

every motion must “be in writing unless

7,

made

its

motion. Pursuant to I.R.C.P.

during a hearing or

particularity the grounds for the relief sought including the

number 0f the

any.” I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b)(1)(A), (B). Defendant’s Motion 0n the Verdict

ever brought this issue by

have been for the
allowed

GFHD

way of formal motion to

district court t0 enter

t0 ﬁle a

the district court.

trial”

and

“state with

applicable civil rule, if

was

GFHD

the ﬁrst time

The proper procedure should

judgment 0n the jury verdict pursuant

post-judgment remittitur under I.R.C.P 59. The

would have been bound by

ever cite to any rule

the proper standard of review for a motion

t0 I.R.C.P. 58,

district court

JNOV,

and

thereby

deferential to the

jury’s ﬁndings 0f fact:

A

jury verdict must be upheld if there

is

evidence of sufﬁcient quantity and

probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion t0
that

0f the jury. In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for

JNOV the

not reweigh evidence, consider Witness credibility, 0r compare

its

court

factual

may

ﬁndings

with that 0f the iurv. The court reviews the facts as ifthe moving party had admitted
any adverse facts, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
April Beguesse, Inc.

v.

Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 509, 328 P.3d 480, 489 (2014) (emphasis added).
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Instead,

nominating

GFHD

itself as the

ﬁled an improper and untimely motion, and the

de novo

district court erred

0f fact 0n the issue of future damages. The

trier

by

district court’s

Memorandum Decision and Orders must be vacated.
The IPPEA Expressly Provides a Remedy For “Lost Wages” that the Idaho Supreme
Court Deﬁnes t0 Include Both Past and Future Lost Wages

2.

The

district court erred

when

it

perceived the jury’s award 0f future lost wages as an issue

0f “equity” rather than “actual damages” under the IPPEA. Smith contends that the question 0f
Smith’s future lost wages was properly instructed for the jury t0 decide as an issue 0f fact. Smith
asserts the district court’s

Memorandum Decision and Order was improperly premised 0n GFHD’S

erroneous construction 0f the IPPEA, and ignored dispositive Idaho Supreme Court decisions.

GFHD’S argument can be summarized
by the

district court in

o

Part B 0f its

“Importantly, the

o

p.

I,

“As discussed above,

“Therefore,
matter,

R. Vol.

I,

p.

it is

when

the

I,

not

list

front

pay among remedies available under

749, ﬁrst sentence last paragraph.

front

reinstatement.” R. Vol.

o

May 2018 Memorandum Decision and Order:

IPPEA does

the statute.” R. V01.

quoting the logical sequence of sentences utilized

p.

an equitable remedy When awarded in lieu of

pay

is

75 1,

last

sentence ﬁnal paragraph.

Supreme Court references a

‘trier

referencing the court, not a jury.” R. V01.

I,

p.

0f

fact’ in

an equitable

752, second paragraph.

749—52. (emphasis added). However, each 0f the above statements

applied t0 the IPPEA, speciﬁcally Idaho

Code

is

incorrect as

Sections 6-2105 and 6-2106:

§ 6-2105. Remedies for employee bringing action—-Pr00f required.
(1)

As used in this

Violation of this

(2)

“damages” means damages for iniurv 0r loss caused bV each
chapter, and includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

section,

An employee who alleges

a Violation of this chapter

may bring a civil action for

appropriate iniunctive relief 0r actual damages, 0r both, Within one hundred eighty (1 80)

days after the occurrence 0f the alleged Violation 0f this chapter.
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§ 6-2106. Court orders for Violation 0f chapter.

A

court, in rendering a

judgment brought under

this chapter,

may

order any 0r

all

0f the

following:

(4)

The compensation

for lost wages, beneﬁts

and other remuneration[.]

Idaho Code §§ 6-2105—2106 (emphasis added).
I.C. §

6-2106(4) allows the remedy 0f “compensation for lost wages, beneﬁts, and other

remuneration.”

Id.

(emphasis added). This Court uniformly deﬁnes the term “lost wages” to

both past and future

lost

mean

wages:

Both back pay and front pay are subsets 0f the global term “lost wages.” The words
“lost wages” d0 not differentiate between wages lost before 0r after trial. This is
illustrated by the fact that lost wages are t0 be awarded as an element 0f “actual
damages,” which are commonly understood as those actual losses caused by the
conduct at issue. In other words, the purpose of the 10st wages element of damages
is t0 restore to the Plaintiff all of the beneﬁts lost as a result of the Violation 0f the
Idaho Human Rights Act. There is no distinction drawn in the statute between
actual damages suffered before the case reaches a courtroom from those arising
after trial.”

0 ’Dell v.

Basabe, 119 Idaho 76

at

81

810 P.2d 1082

1,

Rights Act). “Compensation for lost wages”
2105(2), not “injunctive relief,” which

is

is

at

1097 (1991) (applying the Idaho

a subset 0f “actual damages” available under LC. § 6-

an equitable remedy.

Id.

Importantly, the instructions the district court gave the jury

m

use the terms “front pay”

0r “back pay.” Instead, the district court utilized an instruction similar t0 IDJI 9.01,
t0 “past earnings lost”

Question N0.

and “future” earnings
2:

by
Employees Act?

which

lost:

What

Plaintiff as a result

is the amount 0f actual damages, if any, in past income 10st
0f the Defendant’s Violation 0f the Idaho Protection 0f Public

Answer
What

t0

Question

2:

$63,043.92

amount of damages, if any, of future income lost by
Defendant’s
Plaintiff as a result of the
Violation 0f the Idaho Protection 0f Public
Question No.

5:

is

the

Employees Act?
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Human

refers

Answer
R. Vol.

I,

p.

after the trial.

3.

district court’s

Use of those terms

IPPEA and Idaho
damages”

Idaho Const.

Question

5:

$187,500

529 (emphasis added).

GFHD’S and the

“actual

t0

is

law. Instead, the

for a

art. I, § 7;

use 0f the terms “front pay” and “back pay” only came up

inaccurate and inapplicable t0 the statutory language 0f the

IPPEA

which a jury trial

is

refers t0 “lost

available t0 litigants as a matter 0f constitutional right.

see also I.C. § 6-2105(2).

Equitable Remedies Are Not Available

The law

in

wages,” which are the legal remedy 0f

Idaho

is

When A Legal Remedy Is Adequate

consistent With the

common law

extraordinary relief, and are not appropriate Where there

is

that equitable remedies are

an adequate and complete remedy

at

law:

For over 200 years it has been recognized “that suits in equity shall not be sustained
in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy can be had at law.
(Citation omitted.) During the development of the jurisdiction of courts of equity,
it came to be recognized that equitable relief would not be granted if the award 0f
.

.

.

law was adequate to protect the interest of the injured party.
of Contracts § 359(a) (1981). Accordingly, there is n0 need t0
entertain an equitable cause 0f action for indemniﬁcation when Scona and CNS, A
Fortiori, had a legal cause of action against Beal for breach of contract.

damages

at

Restatement

(2nd)

Farmers National Bank

v.

Wickham Pipeline Construction, 114 Idaho 565, 568, 759 P.2d

(1988) (emphasis added). The award 0f actual

some

cases, there are both equitable claims

money damages

and

legal claims.

is

a legal remedy, not equitable. In

This Court set forth a procedure t0

be followed in those situations in the landmark case of Idaho First National Bank

v.

Bliss Valley

Foods, Ina, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991):

When

and equitable issues are joined in a lawsuit, the trial court should ﬁrst
decide the equitable issues and then if any independent issues remain, those issues
may be tried t0 a jury upon appropriate request. (Citation omitted.) When a case
involves both legal and equitable issues, the Court may in its discretion decide the
legal

equitable issues ﬁrst.

If the decision as t0 the equitable issues

determinative 0f the legal issues, a jury
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trial

71, 74

as t0 the later is obviated.

is

such as

If not, the

jury
Id. at

not

trial

as to the remaining issues will follow.

290, 824 P.2d at 865. Therefore, equitable remedies are t0 be determinedprior t0 a jury

trial,

after.

Here,

all parties

agreed the equitable relief 0f reinstatement would be inappropriate.

Therefore, the only issues remaining are purely legal issues, for Which the jury trial

By

regarding both past and future lost wages.

the time the

trial

was

dispositive

commenced, Smith was only

seeking compensatory damages for her actual lost income. The district court’s invocation of
equitable remedies

4.

Smith

was

reversible legal error.

Had a Right t0

Constitution Art.

I,

0n Her IPPEA Claim Pursuant t0 Idaho
and I.R.C.P. Rule 38

Trial By Jury

section 7

“[170 say that the court can peremptorily submit a law case t0 a referee over the
objection 0f all parties t0 the litigation,
constitutional right t0 trial byjury,
right 0fthe citizens.” Russell

“The

right

of trial by jury

Rule 38(a). “[T1he iurV system

v.

and thereby deprive

citizens

0f

their

not in accord with our view 0fthe constitutional

Alt, 12

shall

is

is

Idaho 789, 88 P. 416, 418 (1907).

remain inviolate.” Idaho Const.

the single

art. I,

§ 7; see also I.R.C.P.

most important guardian of the people's

right to

be

protected from oppressive and overreaching government.” Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass’n

v.

Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 249, 869 P.2d 554,

566 (1993) (emphasis added). Smith

rightfully

invoked

her constitutional and legal right to try her claim before a jury 0f her peers in this matter, and therefore
the jury’s determination 0f the legal facts 0f this action

is

dispositive.

This Court and others have consistently recognized the right t0

Applying Idaho’s Whistleblower Act,

this

Court deﬁnitively

stated,

trial

by jury under the IPPEA.

“This Court will not set aside a

jug verdict 0n appeal if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Van

Cm, Ina, 156 Idaho
in actions

696, 700, 330 P.3d 1054, 1058 (2014) (Van

under the Idaho Whistleblower Act are

N0. CV09-336-CWD, 2010

t0

16

17,

PortneufMed.

(emphasis added). “Issues 0f fact

be resolved by a jury.” Jones

WL 996476, at *3 (D. Idaho Mar.
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II)

v.

2010) (Van

v.

v.

Home Fed. Bank,

PortneufMed.

Cm,

147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009) (Van

Supreme Court reafﬁrms
supported by adequate
distinction

the principle that ajury

facts.

jug

See Van, 156 Idaho

between the type of discord

above and beyond protected
verdict,

we need

Whistleblower Act

’s

activity”);

that

may

see also

1)).

Throughout the Van II decision, the Idaho

determination shall be dispositive, so long as

at

704 (“A properly—instructed

at

707 (“Because

the issue 0f damages

which goes

is

w

we uphold the judgment Lthe

not address Van's issue regarding damages. That

liability,

my can draw the

inhere from Whistleblowing and that

id.

since

is,

moot”); see also Curlee

v.

Kootenai

found n0

Cly. Fire

Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 397, 224 P.3d 458, 464 (2008) (“[The] determination properly belongs

jug at trial and not the judge
the Idaho

at the

summary judgment

Supreme Court d0 not mistakenly

conﬂate the “jury” with the “judge” as the

0f fact

‘trier

0f

0f

under the [PPEA, or mistakenly

like the district court suggests. R. V01.

752 (“Therefore, when the Supreme Court references a

&

m

stage.”) (emphasis added). Prior decisions

refer t0 the jury’s role

trier

it is

fact’ in

an equitable matter,

I,

p.

it is

referencing the court, not a jury”).

Similarly, other jurisdictions

have also addressed whether there

whistleblower claims. Importantly, the legislative history 0f the

was modeled

after

Minnesota’s Whistleblower

MOTION:

mean

all

if the

a right to

trial

[PPEA demonstrates

by jury

for

Idaho’s statute

statute:

Rep. Berain moved that
“d0 pass” recommendation.

Chairman Tippets asked

is

H

242 be sent t0 the ﬂoor with a

deﬁnition 0f “public body” was intended t0

the groups that are listed in the legislation be considered the

“public body”. Rep. Berain stated that the “public body”

is

t0

mean all

state

agencies and the heads of those agencies. Chairman Tippets wondered if
further clariﬁcation 0f the deﬁnition of these state agencies should be in the
legislation.

Rep. Berain pointed out that

this legislation is

modeled

after

Minnesota Law.
R. V01.

I,

p. 809,

House Human Resources Committee Minutes, March

5,

1993,

H 242 (emphasis

added); see also Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.932 (West). In applying Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act
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to the exact question

Court held that

back

it

of Whether a right to

was analogous

trial

by jury exists under the Act,

to a legal cause

0f action arising under

the Minnesota

common law

Supreme

that dates

to at least 1861:

common law as early as 186 1. (citation
we recognized that an employee, under a
an action for money damages in a district

In Minnesota, wrongful discharge existed at
omitted). In early decisions

by

this court

breach-of—contract theory, could bring

court for wrongful termination of employment. (citations omitted). In those actions,
plaintiffs

sought legal remedies in the form 0f money damages in courts of law.

contract actions brought in a court 0f law for

money damages,

g

Claims for wrongful

discharge were causes 0f action at law, and they were consequently tried t0 iuries.

Abraham

v.

Cly.

ofHennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 350—51 (Minn. 2002)

(emphasis added).

As wrongful

discharge claims were traditionally recognized to be jury issues

prior t0 the adoption 0f Idaho’s Constitution, Smith

inviolate right

under Idaho Const.

The determination of

(internal citations omitted)

art. I,

future 10st

§ 7

is

entitled t0 a trial

and I.R.C.P. Rule

wages

is

by jury

as a matter 0f

38(a).

an issue 0f legal fact for the jury to determine

based 0n the competent evidence presented 0n the record. Moreover, the jury’s determination of
lost

wages

is

entirely distinct

from the court’s own discretionary determination 0f whether other

equitable or injunctive relief is appropriate. Here, both parties agree equitable relief is not feasible.

For the above reasons, Smith respectfully asks that

Memorandum Decision and Order with an
5.

GFHD
Even

equitable

’s

this

Court vacate the

district

court’s

order t0 enter ﬁnal judgment 0n the jury’s verdict.

Post-Trial Motion for a Court Trial violated LR. C.P. Rule 39

if this

Court upholds the

remedy under

the

district court’s

IPPEA, Smith was

still

determination that future lost wages

entitled to trial

by jury

Advisory Jury; Jury Trial by Consent. In an action not
jury, the court, on motion or 0n its own:

triable

of right by a

may, with the parties' consent, try any issue bV a iurV whose verdict has
the same effect as if a jury trial had been a matter of right.
(2)

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-
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an

as a matter of binding

consent under I.R.C.P. Rule 39(c)(2):

(c)

is

I.R.C.P. 39 (emphasis added).

Smith

the court, but scheduling orders d0.”

reiterates the fact that “[s]tipulations

KDN Mgmt.,

Inc.

v.

WinCo Foods, LLC, 164 Idaho

P.3d 422, 428 (2018). Just as the parties are bound by their stipulation,

may alter its

district court

case,

order for a

Smith timely demanded a

District

Judge

Medema

trial

ordered a

trial

by

trial

by jury

jury.

Smith money damages totaling $250,543.92.
Ferry

Highway District decided

it

it is

It

wanted a Court

423

1,

ill-conceived that the

after the iurV already entered its verdict. In this

The Defendant timely demanded a

jury.

by

of counsel d0 not bind

A jury trial
was not
trial to

trial

by

jury.

was conducted. The jury awarded

until after the jury verdict that

Glenns

avoid the jury verdict:

Defendant Glenns Ferry Highway District ﬁled a Motion 0n the Verdict 0n
7, 2018 (“Defendant’s Motion 0n Verdict”) asking the Court t0 treat the

First,

March

jury’s February 9,

R. V01.

I,

p. 738.

2018 verdict as advisory,

.

.

.

The discrepancy between the jury and the

district judge strikes at the

fundamental

purposes that underly our judicial system’s function of avoiding inconsistent results and

encouraging public faith in our judiciary:

(1)

it

preserves the acceptability ofjudicial dispute resolution against the corrosive

disrespect that

would follow

if the

same matter were twice

litigated to inconsistent

results;

(2)

it

serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of

repetitious litigation;

(3)

it

and

advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive

claims.

Ticor Title C0.

v.

Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007) (applying the doctrine 0f

resjudicata).

Here, the parties are faced with incredibly inconsistent results depending on

proper
costs

trier

of

fact.

The

and expenses for

result is a loss

all

19

the

0f credibility for our court system, as well as substantial

parties involved.
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who was

GFHD’S

ability t0

change “the rules 0f the game”

after

the

trial

tarnishes the integrity

purpose 0f the

The

IPPEA

and impartiality 0f our justice system and undermines the intended

itself:

hereby ﬁnds, determines and declares that government constitutes
a large proportion 0f the Idaho work force and that it is beneﬁcial t0 the citizens 0f
legislature

this state t0 protect the integritv

for public

of government bV providing a legal cause of action

employees Who experience adverse action from their employer as a result

0f reporting waste and Violations 0f a law, rule 0r regulation.
Idaho Code § 6-2101 (emphasis added).

Smith asks that

Court afﬁrm the fundamental principles of our justice system by

this

recognizing the jury’s axiomatic role as “[T]he single most important guardian 0fthe people's right
to

be protected from oppressive and overreaching government.” See Savage Lateral Ditch Water

Users Ass'n, 125 Idaho

at 249.

Such a decision

“[t]hese rules should be construed

The Uncontroverted Evidence Supports
Smith maintains that the issue of her

and

that the jury’s verdict

must be afﬁrmed

Court were t0 determine the

district

wages, Smith maintains the
evidence presented

consistent with I.R.C.P. Rule

and administered

determination of every action and proceeding.”

B.

is

Id.

t0 secure the

ju_st,

My

and inexpensive

(emphasis added).

the Jurv’s Verdict For Lost

lost

Wages

wages was properly decided by the jury

for entry 0f ﬁnal judgment.

judge was the proper

district court’s decision

trier

discretion.” Climax,

However, even

if this

of fact on the issue 0f future

was contrary

t0 the clear

LLC v.

district court's rulings

0n equitable remedies

lost

weight of the

for an abuse 0f

Snake River Oncology ofE. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791, 794, 241

P.3d 964, 967 (2010). The standard 0f review for an abuse 0f discretion

“is

perceived the issue as one 0f discretion, acted within the outer boundaries 0f

whether the court
its

consistently with the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to

decision

at trial,

at trial.

“This Court reviews the

its

that provides

1

by an exercise 0f reason.”
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Read

v.

discretion

it,

and

and reached

Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d

661, 666 (2009) (emphasis added).

On

the issue 0f future damages, “[E]Vidence

sufﬁcient if

is

it

proves the damages with reasonable certainty. ‘Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute
assurance nor mathematical exactitude; rather, the evidence need
existence of damages from the realm 0f speculation.’

”

Grifﬁth

v.

oan be

sufﬁcient to remove the

Clear Lakes Trout C0,, Inc. 146
,

Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

“Any claim 0f

damages

is

for prospective loss contains an element of uncertainty, but that fact

recovery.” Mueller

Even

v.

Hill,

if the district

158 Idaho 208, 214, 345 P.3d 998, 1004 (2015).
court correctly perceived the issue 0f Smith’s future lost wages as one

0f equitable discretion, Smith asks

this

Court to hold that the

discretion consistent with the applicable legal standards and

1.

GFHD

district court failed to exercise its

by exercise of reason.

“Bears the Risk 0fthe Uncertainty” Regarding Smith ’s Lost Future Wages

Smith contends the

district court

abused

discretion

its

by

failing t0

apply the well-

established principle that “the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty

wrong has

created.” Smith

v.

by

failing to

district court erred

apply the standard to

its

by

failing t0 instruct the jury

0f law

is

of the uncertainty which his

id;

see also Thurston Enterprises, Inc.

(Idaho 2019); Mueller

Diversiﬁed Care,
v.

own wrong has

Inc.

v.

v.

own

Hill,

on

this standard,

v.

that the

wrongdoer

created.” Id. This essential principle

not controversial in the State 0f Idaho—it has been afﬁrmed

dozen times. See

his

own Memorandum Decision and Orders.

“The most elementary conceptions ofjustice and public policy require
shall bear the risk

Which

Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 900, 104 P.3d 367, 374 (2004) (applying the

IPPEA) (emphasis added). The
as well as

not fatal to

by

Safeguard Bus.

this

Court

Sys., Inc.

,

at least half a

435 P.3d 489

158 Idaho 208, 214, 345 P.3d 998, 1004 (2015); Saint Alphonsus

MRIASSOCS., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 116, 334 P.3d 780, 790 (2014); Grifﬁth

Clear Lakes Trout C0., 143 Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604, 612 (2007); O'Dell

Idaho 796, 812—13, 810 P.2d 1082, 1098—99 (1991) (Citing Bigelow
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v.

v.

Basabe, 119

RKO Radio Pictures,

Ina,

327 U.S. 251, 265, 66

Paper
is

S. Ct.

574, 580 (1946), quoting Story Parchment C0.

282 U.S. 555, 564, 51

C0.,

that although the Plaintiff in

S. Ct.

an action

248, 250—51 (1931)).

at all

The

effect

v.

Paterson Parchment

0f this statement oflaw

times bears the burden of proof, the Defendant

may

not use the fact that future damages cannot be proven with “absolute assurance nor mathematical
exactitude” as a complete defense t0

liability.

See Smith, 140 Idaho

at

900, 104 P.3d at 374

(“Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conﬂicting, will not be disturbed

on appeal.”) (emphasis added).
Smith repeatedly requested application 0f the “wrongdoer’s burden”
post-trial brieﬁng.

For example, Smith requested the Grzﬁth

v.

both

at

trial

Clear Lakes and Smith

v.

and

in

Mitton

language be included in Jury Instruction N0. 23, which speciﬁcally instructed “Whether Ms. Smith
has proved any of these damages t0 a reasonable degree of certainty

I,

p. 510.

Over Smith’s objection

is

for

you

t0 decide.” R. V01.

the district court declined t0 include the Smith

and Griﬂith

language in the instruction t0 the jury:

The Court ﬁnds

language does

cite a principle, but it is not included in the
That
standard ICJI [sic] instructions.
case has been around, the 1946 easel, for a
signiﬁcant amount 0f time. But in the more recent Idaho case cited, the Griﬂith

case, that

language

is
is

that

2007. ICJI

[sic]

has not been revised t0 include that language. That

not mandatory under the law from the Supreme Court. The Court ﬁnds

that the ICJI [sic] instruction included in the Court’s instruction is adequate

deﬁnition 0f the types 0f damages the jury can consider.
Tr. V01.

I,

at 191, p. 627, L.

11—22. Despite acknowledging that the proposed instruction was an

accurate statement 0f law, and never articulating a basis to suggest

district court

1

Counsel for

refused to instruct the jury on the proposed language.

GFHD

erroneously asserted that Smith

case,” as though binding precedent
Tr. V01.

I,

at 191, p.

Supreme Court

case,

is

somehow

627, L. 1—5. Counsel for

it

RKO Radio Pictures,

Id. Similarly,

prejudicial, the

Smith briefed the

Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 367 (2004) was a “1946

less persuasive if

GFHD

would be

it

has been applicable for over half a century. See

likely mistakenly confused Smith with the

1946 United States

Ina, 327 U.S. 251, 265, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946), which the
stated the same proposition in 1991. See 0 ’Dell, 1 19 Idaho at 8 12—1 3, 810 P.2d at 1098—

Bigelow

0 ’Dell Court cited t0 When

v.

it

v.

99.
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district court

on the principle

Verdict and in

its

in both

Memorandum

in

its

Memorandum

in

Supportfor Post-Judgment

788—89. However, the language was never cited in the
Decision and Order, nor
Vol.

I,

p.

its

Opposition

February 2019

738—72; see also Supp. R. V01.

I,

Defendant ’s Motion 0n the
See R. V01.

Relief.

district court’s

Memorandum

p.

t0

I,

p.

602—03,

May 2018 Memorandum

Decision and Order. See generally R.

71—98.

Application 0f the “wrongdoer’s burden” was particularly appropriate in this case, because

GFHD’S

lone articulated defense t0 Smith’s claim that she would have worked full-time but-for

GFHD’S retaliation was

the “at-will

brieﬁng, the only evidence

employment”

GFHD

Both

at trial

and

in

GFHD’S post-trial

ever introduced t0 rebut the fact that Smith would have

inevitably replaced Linda Jensen as the full-time

at-will

doctrine.

Ofﬁce Manager was

the fact that Smith

was an

employee, and therefore “had n0 binding promise” that “guaranteed” she would ﬁll the

full-

time position:

had n0 binding promise that she would ever be more than a part-time
employee with no beneﬁts. She did not enter into any written contract (as Mrs.
Jensen did) and she conceded at trial, consistent with the policy manual, that only
the Board of Commissioners, not Jim Gluch nor Linda Jensen, could make any
promise 0f continued employment 0r promotion. No commissioner made any such
promise individually, and certainly there was not such promise made by the Board
itself. In fact, at least as early as March 20 1 6 (prior t0 Plaintiff” s report 0f the Jensen
overpayments) the Board was already talking about ﬁnding a replacement for Mrs.
Jensen, but made no promise (written 0r otherwise) to Plaintiff that it would be her
0r otherwise promised that she would become a regular, full-time employee.
Plaintiff

In short, the evidence adduced at

trial

shows

that Plaintiff

had no guarantee 0f a

job, let alone a promotion 0f any kind.

R. V01.

I,

p.

573 (Defendant’s

strategic decision t0 rely

Idaho

law—Which

Memorandum

0n Smith’s

“at-will”

in

Support 0f Motion 0n the Verdict).

employment

GFHD’S

status as a “defense” is contrary t0

recognizes that future 10st wages are recoverable, even for at-will employees

under claims of common law wrongful discharge:
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“The

damages

fact that contract

are not capable 0f exact proof does not preclude

of law. The rule is that the measure of damages is such
compensate for the loss suffered as the result of a breach 0f contract.”
(citation omitted). Damages relating t0 lost future beneﬁts must be proven With

their availability as a matter

as Will

“reasonable certainty”:

Where a claim is asserted for the recovery 0f future beneﬁts, the burden of
proof is upon the plaintiff to prove With reasonable certainty the amount 0f
by the conduct of the defendant. In the context of an
employment contract for an indeﬁnite term, a plaintiff might resort to
evidence such as employment history to show likelihood of future

the loss caused

employment.

Hummer
Idaho

v.

810 P.2d

at 812,

The
is it

Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996) (citing O'Dell
at 1098).

“at—will” doctrine

is

not a defense to workplace discrimination under the IPPEA, nor

a valid basis t0 reduce Smith’s jury award for future

However, the

district court

0f Law” as a basis

t0

Basabe, 119

v.

erroneously relied upon

deny Smith

damages given the “wrongdoer’s burden.”

GFHD’S

“at will” defense in

its

“Conclusions

full-time wages:

12. The Plaintiff is not entitled to claim damages for full-time employment as she
was never a full-time employee and she never had a contract or agreement with
GFHD to become a full-time employee. The GFHD Personnel Policy Manual does
not create a duty or mandatory requirement 0n the part 0f the Commissioners t0

hire

an existing employee for posted positions.

Supp. R. V01.

The
that

I,

p. 85.

district court’s

Smith needed

which

is

t0

February 25, 2019

Memorandum

Decision and Order appears t0 hold

prove her transition t0 full-time employment with “absolute assurance,”

plainly the incorrect legal standard. See Grijﬁth, 146 Idaho at 618,

district court

retaliation.

at 1167.

The

thereby undermined “[t]he most elementary conceptions ofjustice and public policy”

by requiring an overly burdensome standard of
acknowledge

200 P.3d

that

proof,

While simultaneously refusing t0

GFHD, not Smith, bore the burden 0f the uncertainty created by GFHD’S illegal

See Smith, 140 Idaho

at,

900, 104 P.3d at 374.

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF-

24

The

district court

abused

its

discretion.

2.

Would Work Full-Time, N0
Argument She Would Remain Part—Time

All Evidence Supports the Jury’s Conclusion Smith

Evidence Supports

The

substantial

time employee. In
full-time

GFHD

and undisputed evidence

GFHD

fact,

employment. There

argument (and the
until she retired,

failed to present

is

0n appeal

if

less the “substantial

it is

It is

that

Smith would not transition

0n the record

that supports

t0

GFHD’S

would have been a part-time employee

330 P.3d

at

1058 (“This Court will not

set aside a jury

Memorandum

Decision and Order and enter judgment

verdict.

by the

district court that

support Smith’s claim

damages:

Ms. Smith worked for the GFHD from 2007 t0 2016, except for a period where
she was laid off due to the recession. In 2009, she was laid off for approximately
12 months. There was a time When she was laid off that she volunteered t0 help at
the ofﬁce due to the illness 0f the ofﬁce manager. She was not paid for this work
and did not ask to be paid as she was receiving unemployment beneﬁts. She was
4.

later rehired

by GFHD.

working 4 hours a day for two days a week with some extra
hours as needed. At the time 0f her termination, she was working two days a week
for 8 hours a day. Her ofﬁce responsibilities increased over time. One of the skills
she learned related t0 payroll duties. Ms. Smith did not perform the same duties as
the Ofﬁce Manager and was not trained in how t0 prepare the GFHD budget. Ms.
Smith was capable of learning how to prepare the GFHD budget as well as the other
5.

full-

evidence” required t0 overturn the jury’s ﬁndings t0

helpful to begin with the facts accepted

for full-time

Smith would have become a

supported by substantial and competent evidence.”). Smith asks that this

court therefore vacate the district court’s

0n the jury’s

any evidence

conclusion) that Smith

the contrary. See Van, 156 Idaho at 700,

verdict

at trial indicates

essentially zero evidence

district court’s

much

’s

Ms. Smith

started out

duties in the ofﬁce.
6. Until the spring of2016, Ms. Smith’s supervisor was the GFHD Ofﬁce Manager,
Linda Jensen. Ms. Smith was aware Ms. Jensen intended to retire as the ofﬁce
manager and Ms. Jensen had previously indicated t0 Ms. Smith, she would
recommend her for the position. Ms. Smith’s duties were increasing as she was
trained on other areas of the Ofﬁce responsibilities.
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Ms. Smith started out at $11 per hour and received a raise in 2014 t0 $15 dollars
an hour and a three percent raise in 2015 t0 $15.45 per hour. Effective July 1, 2016,
she received a raise t0 $18 per hour.
7.

Ms. Smith and Ms. Jensen were sharing the Ofﬁce duties When Ms. Jensen
started working part-time, but is unclear What the exact difference in duties were
except that Ms. Jensen was in charge ofpreparing the budget for the Commissioners
consideration. Ms. Smith indicated she was just beginning to be included in
formatting the budget. So in April of 2016, the ofﬁce duties were being completed
by two employees in approximately 32 hours a week when in the past it had been
Ms. Jensen being paid for 40 hours plus beneﬁts and Ms. Smith being paid for 16
hours With n0 beneﬁts. Ms. Jensen and Ms. Smith worked 0n different days s0 the
ofﬁce had coverage four days a week.
15.

20.

Ms. Smith was upset with the Commissioner’s decision

in July t0 post

what she

considered her position. The position was published in the paper on July 20, 2016

on the person selected. (Exhibit
0n the date the classiﬁed ad was

as either a part—time 0r full-time position depending

37)

.

.

.

Ms. Smith applied

for the posted position

published. (Exhibit 12)[.]

Ms. Smith was terminated effective August 8, 2016, but was paid her normal
hours and hourly pay of $18 through the end of August 2016. (Exhibit 5)[.]
24.

Ms. Smith was terminated from GFHD, Ms. Lucille Allen was hired by
employee working 32 hours a week Which allowed
her to receive beneﬁts (employees working at least 32 hours a week are considered
full-time employees at the GFHD). Ms. Allen’s starting wage was $18 per hour.
After Ms. Jensen completed her one-year contract With GFHD and had trained Ms.
Allen, Ms. Allen’s hours were increased t0 40 hours per week. As a full-time
employee, Ms. Allen also received the annual raises awarded t0 all full-time
26. After

the Commissioners as an ofﬁce

employees.

The jury determined that Ms. Smith had engaged in protected activity under the
suffered an adverse employment action because she reported the waste
0f government funds involving Ms. Jensen’s checks. The jury determined damages
for back pay and as well as the advisory verdict for front pay. The jury verdict
clearly awarded damages assuming Ms. Smith was promoted.
30.

IPPEA and

Supp. R. V01.

The

I,

p.

73—82 (February 25, 2019 Memorandum Decision and Order).

district court therefore

Who had worked

for the

highway

acknowledged
district for

that

Smith was a long-time employee 0f GFHD,

nearly eight years. Id. at

1]

4.

Over the course 0f her

employment, Smith’s responsibilities steadily increased, as did the number 0f hours she worked.
Id. at

ﬂ

5.

Smith testiﬁed she had been told many times by Jensen that Smith would take over when
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Jensen

retired. Id. at

6.

1]

As

Smith’s duties increased, Smith earned several raises over her career,

including one in July 2016 to $18.00 an hour. Id. at ﬂ
additional duties Smith

was undertaking

The Ofﬁce Manager position was a
siX hours per

week

full-time job, that required

to complete. Id. at

Lucille Allen. Id. at

1]

26.

The pay

ﬂ

15.

From

Id.

anywhere from thirty-two

April 2016 until Smith

full-time

Ms. Allen’s hours were increased

t0

Each 0f these

become

facts,

accepted by the

district court,

was terminated, Smith

(minimum 32 hours per

40 hours per week.

a full-time employee, Ms. Allen also received the annual raises awarded t0

Id.

to ﬁfty-

Smith was terminated, she was replaced

duties. Id. After

Ms. Allen was immediately hired

week), Which included beneﬁts.

raises corresponded t0 the

as she prepared to replace Jensen after Jensen retired. Id.

and Jensen shared the Ofﬁce Manager job

by

7.

all

Id.

As

full-time employees.

support Smith’s claim that she would have

a full-time employee, but-for Smith’s retaliation.

However, the

district court also

omitted several important

preference for hiring from Within, Which was codiﬁed in the

details. First,

GFHD

GFHD had a policy

employee manual:

From

Within. Qualiﬁed individuals who are already
be given preference over outside applicants to ﬁll
employees 0f
vacancies in the work force. Employees may be selected for transfer to positions
E.

Preference For Hiring

GFHD may

Without following the selection procedures normally required for hiring

new

employees.

Conﬁdential R. V01.

GFHD

I,

p. 33,

closely adhered t0

its

GFHD

175. Furthermore, testimony

by Jim Gluch

preference for hiring from Within, as nearly

promoted based 0n performance from Within the highway

district. Tr.

V01.

I,

all

indicated that

employees were

at 94, p.

15 (Gluch hired initially as road crew, promoted to foreman, then to superintendent).

preference for hiring from within

worker

t0

work

full-time,

and

is

is

further evidence that

direct

proof that

have been retained for the full-time position. The
Smith’s nearly eight years 0f service

at
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it

241, L. 2—

The

stated

GFHD would not have hired an outside

was more probable than not

district court also failed to

GFHD, Smith had

that

Smith would

acknowledge

that in

never been “disciplined, counseled or

received any written 0r oral reprimands.

good worker? A. (Gluch): Yes,

The evidence

.

knew

295, L. 16—18 (Q: and you

at 108, p.

.”
.

Tr. Vol.

I,

at 57, p. 93. L.

in July, at the time

I,

0f that meeting, that Joanie was a

I believe 50.).

demonstrated that prior t0 Jensen’s

at trial

13—22; see also Tr. Vol.

theft,

it

was overwhelmingly

expected that Joanie Smith would replace Linda Jensen as the full-time Ofﬁce Manager, and

Commissioner Harley Riggs admitted
Q.

that fact:

And even though Linda

believe that Ms. Smith

Ms. Jensen continued

Jensen had told the board that at that time they didn’t
was capable 0f doing her job, was it your understanding that

t0 train Joanie

Smith?

A. Yes.

Q.

And that over time —we11, What was the purpose in your mind for her to be trained

in Linda’s Job?

A. She needed t0 learn more about Linda’s job. She hadn’t done everything
involved in the job. So ves, Linda was going t0 train her more and give her
more responsibilitv. That was my understanding.
Tr. V01.

I,

at 178, p. 575, L.

fact that Joanie

was being

Jensen’ s April 20 1 6

12—25 (Redirect Examination ofHarley Riggs) (emphasis added). The

trained to take over the ofﬁce

employment

manager position was acknowledged

in

contract:

Duties for Linda Jensen will be the same as before semi-retirement, With the
assistance of Joanie Smith

R. Vol.

I,

p. 73,

Who Will work 0n Wednesday & Thursday 0f each week.

EX. 22 (emphasis added). The duration 0f Jensen’s contract was “at least one year”

reﬂecting Jensen’s expected retirement.

Id.

The

actual course 0f events supports Smith’s

testimony that she was expressly told she would replace Jensen:
Q.

And What

did you expect t0 happen after Linda retired?

would have the — I had the good job skills, I knew What
needed t0 be done. She had told me that she would give her recommendation
t0 the commissioners for that position and she didn’t see any reason at all Why
I would not get that job.
A.

I

expected that

I
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own

Tr. V01.

at 50, p.

I,

she wanted at

after all

102—03, L. 2 1—3. The undisputed evidence

GFHD, and that the Commissioners

Do you

A. Yes,
Tr. V01.

I,

still

have absolute and complete

would have worked

trust in

12—14 (Chairman Crane).

full time.

demanded Smith

294—95, L. 13—1 (Jensen demanded

GFHD

the fact that

employee with beneﬁts.

is

If Jensen

had recommended Smith, Smith
get the job

ﬁre Smith for requesting a

Plaintiff called

Ms. Allen

distinction is that

0f experience working With
that Jensen

“worked close

still

Ms. Allen was a nearly

GFHD’S complex

t0 full time training

was

at 108, p.

raise).

would have become a
damages

identical comparator t0

I,

at

156—158,

p.

trial,

488—94, L. 1—

billing

me.”

system and procedures. Ms. Allen testiﬁed

Tr. V01.

I,

at 159, p. 500, L.

17—24. Ms. Allen

approximately seventeen months after she was hired in

learning aspects 0f the position:

Q.

By what time do you think you

A.

I

got up to speed?

am not sure if I am still up t0 speed. We have annual reports and I’ve done

most 0f them once 0r parts 0f them already. So
Q. Are you

still

Smith

Smith was more qualiﬁed because Smith had nearly eight years

further admitted that at the time of

September 2016, she

I,

t0 testify primarily as a

of education and work experience. See generally Tr. Vol.

However, the

was because Smith

get ﬁred in retaliation. Tr. V01.

the ultimate direct proof that Smith

Witness. Evidence at trial demonstrated that

22.

Linda Jensen?

Smith’s replacement, Lucille Allen, started working full-time

immediately after replacing Smith

in terms

whatever

money from the highway district:

The only reason Smith did not

reported Jensen’s theft, and Jensen

full-time

that Jensen got

I d0.

at 817, p. 612, L.

Lastly,

was

trusted her completely, even at the time 0f trial

evidence required the conclusion that Jensen stole

Q.

at trial

in the learning curve?

A. For the annual reports yes.
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it

takes a while.

Tr. V01.

I,

at 159, p. 500, L.

18—25.

Comparatively, Jim Gluch admitted that Smith was already actively completing over half
the duties in the

GFHD ofﬁce:

Q. But beginning in April then, it looks to me like
was doing about 3O percent?

maybe

Joanie

was doing 70

percent and Linda

A. She was doing a considerable part 0f that job, yes.
Q:

You wouldn’t disagree with that allegation? And

I

don’t want t0 be unfair.

A. N0.
Q.

You think Joanie was

probably doing 70 percent of the work?

A. I don’t know if she was doing 70 percent 0f the work but she was certainly
taking 0n a lot more 0f that duty than she normally did.
Q. Okay. So you knew
her 50 percent, right?

A.
Tr. V01.

I,

I

believe s0. She

at

104—105,

p.

at the

time 0f the negotiations that Joanie

was taking 0n some

is

doing more than

responsibility, yes.

279—280, L. 13—6. Gluch testiﬁed that

at the

time Smith was ﬁred, he

believed Smith t0 be “honest and trustworthy,” a “very hard worker” and someone that he “liked”

and considered a “friend.”

Tr. V01.

Commissioner Riggs admitted

that

I,

at

109, p. 299—300, L. 22—1; p. 301, L. 7—20.

Smith was the leading candidate for the full-time position

before they ﬁred her:

Q. Okay. Prior t0 being told that she had this written letter of resignation, what was
your opinion of whether Ms. Smith would be in the running for Linda Jensen’s job?

A. Well, she had a good chance because we were putting out the applications
and that is why we told her that she had every opportunity t0 apply for the
job. And she actually, you know, as far as I was concerned, she actually was a
front runner because

if

we were not t0 have any other — if we were not t0 have

any other applicants then Joanie would have had the job.
Tr. V01.

I,

at 170, p. 544, L.

2—13.
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Smith’s experience, her strong performance as a
fact she

was already

termination,

all

fulﬁlling the duties of the

GFHD. When one

hired full-time at the

same wage

would have occurred, but-for GFHD’S

by

Ofﬁce Manager

at the

and the

time 0f her wrongful

support the jury’s ﬁndings that Smith would have continued to

Manager, full-time for

My

GFHD employee, her work ethic,

work

as the

Ofﬁce

then considers Smith’s less-qualiﬁed replacement was

n0 uncertainty What

rate as Smith, there is essentially

illegal retaliation.

The jury’s

verdict

was

plainly supported

substantial evidence.

C. Smith’s Pleadings Provided Proper Notice

Under Rule

8(a)

That She

Was

Seeking Full-

Time Wages
Smith alleges the
that

district court erred

by

ruling at trial that Smith failed t0 provide notice

Smith was seeking damages for the full-time position

at

GFHD.

R. V01.

I,

p.

744 (“H0wever,

the Court found that even under Idaho’s liberal notice pleading standards, Plaintiffs Complaint did

not sufﬁciently allege facts supporting an

[PPEA claim for Defendant’s

failure to hire Plaintiff for

a full-time position”).

“The Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure
v.

establish a system 0f notice pleading.”

Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 668, 182 P. 3d 1199, 1202 (2008).

“A

complaint need only contain a

concise statement of the facts constituting the cause 0f action and a

demand

for relief.” Clark

Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986); see also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).

pleadings should be liberally construed t0 secure a

‘just,

L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002)). “Pleadings

bound

Rule

8(6).

v.
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pleadings.”

party's

Mountain Park Estates,

must be construed so

“With the advent 0f notice pleading, a party

to stating particular theories in

“A

v.

speedy and inexpensive’ resolution 0f the

case.” Youngblood, 145 Idaho at 668, 182 P.3d at 1202 (citing Gillespie

justice.” I.R.C.P.

Youngblood

Cook v.

Skyline

is

as to

do

no longer slavishlv

Corp, 135 Idaho 26,

33, 13

P.3d 857, 864 (2000) (citing Dursteler

v.

Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244 (Ct.App.1985))

(emphasis added).

Smith maintains

that the

Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial provided ample notice that

Smith was seeking damages for full-time employment in paragraphs
10.

Upon

10, 13,

§

6-214

[sic]

took adverse action against Smith

and maliciously and falsely advised the GFHD board members
qualiﬁed t0 d0 her iob or to work full time for the GFHD.
Smith was replaced with a less experienced,
a full-time employee.
13.

14.

As

14(a):

information and belief Linda Jensen, acting as an agent 0f GFHD and as

Smith’s employer pursuant t0 I.C.

Smith

and

less

that

Smith was not

qualiﬁed employee

Who is now

a result 0f the wrongful termination of Smith in Violation of I.C. § 6-2104,
entitled t0 damages including but not limited t0:

is

(a)

Reinstatement t0 her position as a full-time employee and or past and

wages and beneﬁts she would have been entitled t0
time employee at GFHD until her retirement at age 70[.]

as a full-

future lost

R. V01.

Trial).

I,

p.

744 (emphasis added); see also R. V01.

I,

p.

647—48 (Complaint and Demand

for Jury

Despite the fact Smith clearly pleaded she was seeking damages as a full-time employee,

the district court erroneously refused to include the failure to hire Smith full-time under Question

No. 4 on the Special Jury Form:
Question N0. 4: What adverse employment action did GFHD take because Joanie
Smith engaged in a protected activity? (check any that may apply):

[ ]

R. V01.

I,

It

in July

p.

Terminated Joanie Smith

Failed to Hire for Full-Time position

456, 742.

was undisputed

2016 so

(Exhibit 12

[ ]

at trial that

that she could

GFHD

Smith applied for the position that was advertised

assume

full-time work. See Exhibits

327—330); see also Tr. V01.

I,

at 93, p.

on Appeal, V01.

234, L. 4—7. In

fact,

Harley Riggs testiﬁed in his direct examination that Smith was the “front runner”
Jensen as ofﬁce manager. See Tr. V01.
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I,

at 170, p.

544, L. 2—13. However,

I,

at

GFHD

p.

57—60

Commissioner

t0 replace

GFHD

Linda

promptly

terminated Smith before she could assume the full-time position after Jensen called for Smith’s
termination in July 2016. Tr. V01.

329, L. 9—12 (Jensen “bypassed” Gluch t0 call

at 116, p.

I,

Special Meeting to terminate Smith). Instead,
replace Joanie Smith in August 2016. Tr. V01.

GFHD
I,

hired Lucille Allen to

at 159, p.

work

full-time to

498, L. 6—8 (“Q. They hired you

full

time from the get-go? A. Yes”). Smith alleges the failure t0 hire Smith t0 the full-time position

was a

Violation of the

The

IPPEA. R. Vol.

district court’s failure t0

I,

p.

456, 742.

advise the jury 0n the “failure t0 hire” Smith for the full-time

position should constitute “harmless error” if this Court grants Smith’s request t0 vacate the district

court’s

Memorandum

distinction

Decision and Orders and enters judgment 0n the Special Jury Verdict. The

between the separate “adverse actions” 0f GFHD’S wrongful termination and

simultaneous decision not t0 hire Smith t0 the full-time position
jury’s ﬁndings

district court’s

0n Smith’s damages. However, the

distinction

is

essentially

moot

in light

0f the

was extremely prejudicial under the

erroneous conclusion that Smith could only be reinstated (and therefore only

receive future wages) for the “same position” held before the adverse action t0 terminate. R. V01.

I,

p.

753 (“front pay

hold that

it

was

is

a substitute for reinstatement

.

.

.

.”).

legal error not t0 properly instruct the jury

Regardless, Smith asks this Court t0

0n the issue under Idaho’s

liberal notice

pleading standard. See I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).

D. Smith Requests Post-Judgment Interest and Judgment
1.

Nunc Pro Tunc

Idaho Code Section 28-22-1 04 Is Not Barred by Sovereign Immunity
Following

which is

trial,

Smith requested post—judgment

available as a matter 0f statutory right for

a_ll

interest

under Idaho Code

money judgments

§ 28-22-104(2),

entered in the State of Idaho:

§ 28-22-104. Legal rate 0f interest.

on money due on the iudgment of anV competent court
0r tribunal shall be the rate 0f ﬁve percent (5%) plus the base rate in effect at the
time 0f entry of the judgment. The base rate shall be determined 0n July 1 of each
(2)

The

legal rate of interest
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year by the Idaho state treasurer and shall be the weekly average yield 0n United
States treasury securities as adjusted to a constant maturity of one (1) year and

up

rounded
LC.

§

nearest

the

t0

28-22-104(2) (emphasis added). However, the

judgment

interest,

and instead ruled

by sovereign immunity

one-eighth

district court

that post-judgment interest

as applied to

percent

(1/8%).

..

denied Smith’s request for post-

under

I.C. §

28-22-104 was barred

GFHD:

The Court

also noted that the “general statute regarding the rate of interest and the
allowance 0f interest between parties t0 actions” does not contain sufﬁciently
speciﬁc language t0 “automatically include the state within its purview.”

Twin Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d 689
(1992)]. Hence, Idaho Code section 28-22-104 also “does not overcome the
presumption 0f the state’s sovereign immunity.” Id.; accord American Oil C0. v.
Neill, 90 Idaho 333, 338, 414 P.2d 206, 209 (1966) (“[I]t has been held that general
statutes regarding the rate 0f interest and the allowance 0f interest between parties
t0 actions d0 not include the state.”)
[University 0f Utah Hospital

R. V01.

I,

v.

p. 761.

Smith contends the
the decisions in University

(1992) and Sanchez

v.

district court’s ruling

0f Utah Hospital

State,

In County

ofAda

v.

Twin Falls County, 122 Idaho 1010, 842 P.2d 689

Dep't ofCorrection, 143 Idaho 239, 244, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2006),

both of which only apply t0 Qre-l'udgment

this

v.

was reversible error because the Court relied upon

interest:

Red Steer Drive—Ins, Eta,

Court held that neither the

state

101 Idaho 94, 609 P.2d 161 (1980),

nor any 0f

its

political subdivisions are

expressly exempted in LC. § 28—22—104 from paying interest on amounts due on a
judgment rendered against them. That holding overruled American Oil t0 the extent
that American Oil prohibited a post-iudgment interest award against a government
entity on an overpayment 0f tax. Red Steer, 101 Idaho at 100, 609 P.2d at 167. The
holding in Red Steer was admittedly based upon “equitable” principles and should
be limited t0 the facts of that case. See Id. at 100, 609 P.2d at 167; and Id. at 101,
609 P.2d at 168 (McFadden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It does
not affect our adherence to the general rule set forth in American Oil; we decline t0

extend

its

rationale t0 the issue 0f pre-judgment interest at stake in the present case.

Univ. 0f Utah Hosp.

Sanchez, 143 Idaho
interest against

& Med.

at

Ctr.,

122 Idaho

at

1018, 842 P.2d at 697 (emphasis added); see also

244, 141 P.3d at 1113 (“we do not

IDOC.”) (emphasis added).
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ﬁnd a basis

for an

award ofpre—judgment

Instead, the applicability 0f post-iudgment interest against public entities

settled in

County ofAda

v.

Red Steer Drive—Ins, Eta,

was conclusively

101 Idaho 94, 609 P.2d 161 (1980):

Examination of our statutes 0n this matter reveals there is n0 statute expressly
exempting the state 0r any 0f its political subdivisions from paying interest 0n
amounts due as a result 0f a judgment rendered against those entities. Therefore
there is no reason to distinguish the state or anV of its political subdivisions, e. $1.,
Ada County, from private parties who are required t0 pay interest 0n “(m)oney due

would
be inequitable t0 create a special status for the state or its subdivisions whereby the
county could avoid the payment 0f interest, but where private parties would be
required to make such payments. T0 avoid this inequity, the county should be
required t0 pay interest on the district court judgment.
0n the judgment 0f anV competent court 0r tribunal.” LC.

Id. at 100,

under

609 P.2d

I.C. §

at

167 (emphasis added). The

28-22-104(4).

§

Red Steer holding

28-22-104 applies t0 judgment against the State and

its

binding law, and should be enforced 0n Smith’s judgment against

0f Utah Court expressly stated
Idaho

at

Red

that

It

that post-judgment interest

political subdivisions is

GFHD.

still

In fact, the University

Steer remained good law. See University 0f Utah, 122

1018, 842 P.2d at 697 (“That holding overruled American Oil to the extent that American

Oil prohibited a post-judgment interest award against a government entity 0n an overpayment 0f
tax”).

The

equitable principles in Red—Steer are equally applicable in this matter.

The Idaho

Legislature speciﬁcally enacted I.C. § 28-22-104, in conjunction with I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a), so that

defendants in a lawsuit Will not have the beneﬁt 0f an economic Windfall by unnecessarily

withholding payment ofjudgment.

2

Red Steer Drive—Ins, Eta,

101 Idaho at 100, 609 P.2d at 167.

Smith contends the Legislature also abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity when

IPPEA. By

that measure, the legislature’s

mandate

it

enacted the

that post-judgment interest is required for

2 The current base rate of interest for ﬁscal year 2018 was 1.250%, meaning Smith is entitled t0 interest in a total
amount 0f 6.250%. Smith’s Special Jury Verdict 0f $250,532.92 at the legal rate 0f interest equates t0 approximately

$42.90 in interest accrued per day.
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“money due 0n

the

specific” assertion

Sanchez

v.

State,

judgment 0f

by

ﬂy

competent court 0r tribunal”

the legislature that sovereign

a sufﬁciently “clear and

immunity does not apply

in this case.

Dep't ofCorrection, 143 Idaho 239, 244, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2006).

has remained binding law since 1980, and if
the legislature

is

its

would have expressly addressed

See

Red Steer

holding was contrary t0 the Legislature’s intent,

it.

Equity Requires Judgment Be Entered Nunc Pro Tunc T0 the Date 0fthe Jury Verdict

2.

As

This case has been subject t0 extremely abnormal and prejudicial delays.

equity,

Smith asks

this court to order entry

ofjudgment nunc pro tunc

t0 the date

a matter of

0f the Special

Verdict.

As
Black's

this

Law

Court has previously recognized, “nunc pro tunc

retroactive effect t0 a designated date.”

Weszfall, 112 Idaho 712, 714,

judgment nunc pro tunc
Tractor C0.

means ‘now

for then.’

Dictionary (5th Edition 1981). In the present context, the phrase indicates that a

judgment should be given
0f

literally

v.

is

Westmont Tractor C0.

v.

Estate

735 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1987). Smith recognizes that ordinarily,

reserved for “clerical errors” and not “judicial errors.” See Westmont

Estate 0f Westfall, 112 Idaho 712, 714, 735 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1987). However,

Smith asks for an equitable exception because of the extraordinary delays

that

accompanied

this

matter.

“A

determination entails a ﬁnding 0f the facts and an application 0f the law in order t0

resolve the legal rights 0f the litigants

v.

who hope

t0 resolve their differences in the courts.”

Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 712, 587 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1978).

determination 0f every action and proceeding”

See I.R.C.P. Rule

1.

Indisputably,

is

A

“just,

speedy, and inexpensive

necessary for the natural disposition ofjustice.

money has a time value. See Credit Suisse AG v.

Ina, 156 Idaho 189, 201, 321 P.3d 739, 751 (2014); see also Leliefeld
Inc.,

Bunn

v.

Teufel Nursery,

Panorama

Contractors,

111 Idaho 897, 905, 728 P.2d 1306, 1314 (1986); In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098, 1101
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(9th Cir. 2007). This Court recognized the “time value 0f

regarding “present cash value” t0 the jury at
anxiety,

money” when

judgment

effectively denying

is

this

litigant,

Smith

Court have both determined she

Smith justice and

required instructions

See IDJI 9.13. Notwithstanding the

trial.

and duress a pending legal motion can cause for any

of money judgment that a jury and

it

is

is

damaged by delay

owed. Delay 0f ﬁnal

use and investment 0f the

fair

owed, and Which Smith could have otherwise used and invested With a reasonable
Smith requests that

this

equitable relief in this case.

February

verdict,

E.

The

Judgment should be entered nunc pro tune

t0 the date

Court Abused Its Discretion BV Arbitrarily Reducing
Fees From The “Reasonable” Rate 0f $400 Per Hour
an award 0f attorney fees

line in

is

is

of interest.

0f the jury’s

by reducing Smith’s award

the court failed to consider

all

for attorney’s fees

district court

Lettum'ch,

abused

its

from Smith’s contractual amount because

this

v.

Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 433, 196 P.3d 341,

Court recognized a court’s award 0f attorney’s fees cannot be

merely made 0n conj ecture, 0r “pull the award 0f attorney’s fees out 0f thin

why the

v.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, and that the district court “failed t0 reach

by exercise ofreason.” See Johannsen

351 (2008). In Johannsen,

Plaintiff’s Attornev’s

reasonableness.” Lettum’ch

145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008). Smith contends that the

decision

rate

she

2018.

9,

“The bottom

its

money

Court order a retroactive assessment 0f interest as appropriate

District

discretion

stress,

air”:

determined that the attorney's fees submitted by
Respondent were excessive, other than the judge's vague statement that he knows
It is

unclear

district court

is reasonable based on his litigation experience. In
“about
determining the case t0 be
a $10,000 project,” the district court seems t0

what

is

pull the

excessive and What

award 0f

conj ecture

is

attorney's fees out of thin

at

433; see also

H20 Envtl.,

Idaho 295, 429 P.3d 183, 189 (2018) (“[T]he

amount

Basing attorney’s fees 0n pure

inappropriate.

Johannsen, 146 Idaho

t0 the

air.

in controversy represented
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trial

Inc.

v.

Farm Supply

court’s limitation 0fthe

Distributors, Ina, 164

award 0f attorney’s fees

an arbitrary action Which was inconsistent With the

requirements of Rule 54(e)(3) and did not reﬂect a reasoned application of the Rule.”). Here, Smith

contends the

district court

unreasonably reduced Smith’s attorney’s fees for the sole purpose 0f

reducing the overall verdict, and thereby undermined the remedial purpose behind the IPPEA. See
generally LC. § 6-2101.
In support 0f Smith’s

J.

Motion for Costs and Fees, Smith submitted the Aﬂidavit ofJeﬂrey

Hepworth. Counsel addressed

all

I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) factors (A)—(L). See R. V01.

58. Smith’s counsel carefully set forth

Mr. Jeffrey

J.

Hepworth’s

experience, including at least 900 disputes and over 50 jury

set forth that

Mr. Hepworth “asked other attorneys about the

0r attorneys working for one year or less.

reasonable given his
at the

skills, legal

I

540, ﬂ 4.

rate ordinarily

p.

539—

0f

trial

The afﬁdavit

also

thirty-three years

believe the hourly rate [for

charged by associates

J.

Grady Hepworth]

is

education at the University 0f Washington, and intern experience

Idaho Supreme Court, Federal District Court in Idaho, and an externship with the 9th Circuit

Court 0f Appeals in Seattle while in law school.”
is

trials. Id. at

I,

Also of note, addressing factor 54(e)(3)(E),

Id.

the fact that Smith’s counsel accepted Smith’s claim

E. Fixed or Contingent.

Law

is

0f the Fee Agreement
R. V01.

I,

p. 543,

At

The

fee agreement

contingent. If we d0 not win,

1]

is

we do

on a purely contingent

basis:

between Joanie Smith and Hepworth
A true and correct copy

not get paid.
“B.”
attached as Exhibit

E.

the time 0f Smith’s motion for costs and fees, Smith requested total attorney’s fees 0f

$203,131.00. R. V01.

I,

p. 537.

Smith’s total fee request

awards under the IPPEA, such as the $422,272.98 the

is

substantially smaller than recent fee

district court

awarded

t0 counsel in Eller

v.

Idaho State Police, CV-OC-2015-127 (Fourth Judicial District Mar. 26, 2018), 0r the $656,958.90
the district court

awarded

2015). See R. V01.

I,

in Wright

p. 691, 696.

v.

Ada

County, CV-OC-2013-2730 (Fourth Judicial District

However, the

district court nevertheless

Smith’s attorney’s fees award by reducing Jeffrey
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J.

Hepworth’s hourly

signiﬁcantly reduced

rate t0

$325.00 an hour

and

J.

Grady Hepworth’s

object t0 the

rate t0

$150.00 an hour. R. V01.

number 0f hours worked by Smith’s

Smith contends the

district court

abused

I,

p. 769.

counsel.

its

discretion

by ruling that Plaintiff s counsel was

not entitled t0 attorney’s fees at their reasonable contractual hourly

However, the Court ﬁnds
this case. Plaintiff’s

Opposing counsel did not

rate:

that Plaintiff’s requested hourly rate is not reasonable in

counsel avers that “defense lawyers working in top

ﬁrms

in

Boise charge anywhere from $350 t0 $500 per hour,” and that less experienced
Plaintiffs’

counsel sometimes charge between $375.00 and $400.00 per hours.

Although the Court does not dispute that other Boise attorneys have charged similar
fees under a variety 0f circumstances, it does not agree that $400.00 is a reasonable
hourly rate in this case.
R. V01.

I,

p.

768 (emphasis added). However, the court’s ﬁndings are entirely inconsistent, and

therefore arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, in light 0f the

holding in Eller
that

same

district court’s

Idaho State Police, CV-OC-2015-127 (Fourth Judicial District Mar. 26, 2018)

v.

such rates for less experienced counsel in an
Plaintiff also seeks fees for

IPPEA

dispute are reasonable:

work performed by Erik Strindberg and Lauren

0f $425 per hour and $375 per hour respectively. See Birch
EX.
The
A.
Court notes that Mr. Strindberg has practiced law for 24 years,
Aff.,
and Ms. Scholnick has 22 years’ legal experience, Supplemental Birch Aff. at 1] 1,
Scholnick

at the rate

and ﬁnds

that these rates are also reasonable in light

0f counsels’ signiﬁcant

experience.

R. V01.

I,

p.

691 (emphasis added).

Whereas the

district court

admits other attorney’s in the applicable geographic region

charge similar hourly rates, and has even gone so far as t0 declare out-of-state attorneys With less
experience trying a similar matter under the same cause 0f action are reasonable in charging higher
rates, the district court’s contradicting

this case” is

The

conclusion that Smith’s hourly rate

is

not reasonable “in

Without reason.
district court’s

simultaneous decision t0 reduce Smith’s award for future damages and

attorney’s fees leads t0 the conclusion that the district court’s decision
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was outcome-motivated

in

order t0 generally reduce Smith’s verdict as a whole. However, such a result
prejudicial to Smith.

At

trial,

the jury concluded Smith’s “actual” compensatory

is

incredibly

damages should

be $250,543.92. The court awarded Smith attorney fees and costs totaling $ 1 68,177 (attorney fees)

and $8,967.03

(costs). If the court

had entered Judgement and

GFHD paid the judgement, Smith’s

recovery would have been inadequate:

Recovery:

Judgement

$250,543 .92

Attorney Fees

$ 1 68, 1 77

Costs

$8,967.03

Total:

$427,687.95

Attorney fees per contract:

$203, 1 9 1 .50

Money Owed:
Actual costs incurred:

$24,039.76

Total:

$227,231.26

Therefore, pursuant t0 the jury’s verdict,

compensatory damages,
the jury intended.

On

Smith would net approximately $200,456.69

after contractual costs

and fees—A recovery

in

that is $50,087.23 less than

top of that, the district court reduced the damages award and additional

attorney fees were necessary to resolve the claim because of the Motion 0n the Verdict and Motion

for Post-Judgment Relief. The

the Court’s

calculation:

Judgment:

$107,666.26

Attorney Fees Awarded

$168,177

Costs

Under

new

Awarded

(as

0f 2/9/18)

$8,967.03

Total

$284,810.29

Contractual Attorney’s fees:
Total Costs Incurred:

$244,549.00 (as of 6/8/18)
$24,039.76

Total:

$268,588.76

judgment and reduced award 0f costs and

$16,221.53. Such a result

is

fees,

Smith would only receive

entirely inconsistent with the stated purpose

public employees,” and the remedial nature 0f the statute.
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As

0f the [PPEA “t0 protect

a principle ofjustice t0 Smith, the

jury’s verdict

must be awarded
VI.

in full

and additional attorney fees awarded on appeal.

ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

The Whistleblower Act provides

that a court

order “payment

may

by

the employer 0f

reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees” t0 the employee. LC. § 6-2106(5). Likewise, Idaho

Code

section 6-2105’s remedies include “court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.” LC. § 6-2105(1);

see also Wright

v.

Ada

C132,,

160 Idaho 491, 499, 376 P.3d 58, 502 (2016) (permitting an award of

reasonable costs and fees 0n appeal if Wright prevailed on his Whistleblower Act claim 0n

remand).

As

such, Smith should be

awarded her costs and attorney’s fees incurred 0n appeal.
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully asks that this Court vacate the

judgment and remand With an order

for the district court t0 enter judgment

district court’s

0n the jury verdict, plus

reasonable attorney’s fees at Smith’s counsel’s contractual rates, and interest 0n judgment
calculated from the date 0f the jury’s verdict

0n February

9,

2016.

DATED this 3rd day of April, 2019.
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